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# CONFERENCE ANDREI SAKHAROV RESEARCH CENTRE FOR DEWOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT







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# Are good-neighborly relations possible? Conference report

Written by Letizia Santhià Edited by Robert van Voren Photographs by Jonas Petronis Layout design by Bade Design Studios

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# **Executive Summary**

In October 2021, an international conference was organized by the Andrei Sakharov Research Center under the Patronage of the President of Lithuania Gitanas Nausėda. The subject was the development of diplomatic ties between Lithuania and Russia, which were analyzed from different angles and over different time periods, beginning with the signature of the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations between Lithuania and Russia in 1991.

When Lithuania re-established its independence in March 1990, Russia was still part of the USSR. Diplomatic relations between the two countries took a turning point with the signing of a Treaty on July 29th, 1991. This agreement remains an outstanding example of how international law can be the basis for re-establishing new and productive relations. The Treaty contained the principles that guide relations between Lithuania and Russia: the non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs; respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders; cooperation in economic fields and other spheres.

The Treaty was a significant step forward, particularly considering that the Soviet Union was still in place when it was signed, although Russia was beginning to establish an independent foreign policy. Moreover, in the agreement, Russia publicly acknowledged the violation of Lithuanian borders in 1940 and the illegality of Soviet occupation, a result that no other Baltic country had obtained.

The 1991 Treaty was partially the result of developments in international relations between the East and West that followed the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The negotiations took place in an atmosphere of great excitement and desire for change, and despite some eventual friction, the Russian and Lithuanian people and their leaders demonstrated mutual respect and commitment to the ideals of democracy and freedom.

After this historical achievement, positive relations were maintained for some years. However, while Lithuania remained on the path towards democracy and integration in Europe, Russia, unfortunately, regressed to an autocratic regime guided by the authoritarian leader

Vladimir Putin. Lithuania was soon faced with a neighbor that was becoming hostile and threatening. Indeed, the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas; the consequences of the political crisis in Belarus; and the negative attitude of the current Russian leadership toward the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin does not share the respect for international law that prevailed under Boris Yeltsin.

Is there any possibility of evolving the present situation? There is always hope, but it would take great commitment on both sides. Putin's regime appears to offer no prospect for growth or development and therefore any breakthrough in the near future seems unlikely. Outcomes are difficult to predict, however, and one thing seems certain: the Russian population will not always remain passive. As the past has shown, the role of Western democracies, and countries like Lithuania in particular, may stimulate a broader understanding of human rights, civil society, and the rule of law in the region, thus fostering the basis for a new and open dialogue.

# Introduction

On October 28-29, 2021, the Andrei Sakharov Research Center for Democratic Development organized an international conference under the patronage of the President of Lithuania. Prestigious guests, diplomats, and experts gathered to address one main question: thirty years after the signature of the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations between Lithuania and Russia, are good neighborly relations possible? A total of twenty-four speakers shared their expertise with an international audience at the Column Hall of the President's Office and online via live streaming in English, Lithuanian and Russian.



Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuanians and Russians pursued freedom together and succeeded in laying the foundation for a promising future, with fair, equal, and civilized relations based on mutual respect, as **Gitanas Nausėda**, the President of Lithuania, recalled during his opening speech. It would be wrong to view this achievement as the result of efforts by Lithuanian alone; in truth, it was a great victory for Russia as well. Today, however, relations between the two countries are not as smooth, the consequence of having taken different approaches in both domestic and foreign policies. Stigmatizing or demonizing one's counterpart in dialogue serves little purpose, however, and the notion of "good" or "poor" relations should be relinquished when defining links between countries, as Professor **Vytautas Landsbergis** mentioned in his address. They are what they are, and today they are not working.

In the past, the people of both countries had the courage to demonstrate in the streets and demand true democracy, reliable institutions, and strong value positions. Governments were open to a new dimension of foreign relations that, at the time, created a fresh and optimistic perspective. It should not be forgotten that this hope for the future was possible only after reconciliation with the past: in the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations between Lithuania and Russia, Russia admitted the illegality of its occupation of Lithuania in 1940. It was by formalizing this historic truth that the basis for an honest and friendly relationship was laid. With subsequent leaders, however, the situation evolved, and not in a positive way, as today's situation shows. Indeed, the aggressive attitude of Russia toward its "near abroad" caused tensions with its neighbors and made continued dialogue almost impossible.




Can Lithuania once again have constructive interactions with Russia? Predicting the future with certainty is difficult, but it is possible, even preferable, to analyze potential scenarios in order for Lithuania to be prepared for any eventual developments. To accomplish this, it is indispensable to have a clear and lucid picture of the present situation, but also to look back to the starting point of these relations. That is why the conference aimed to touch upon all dimensions of the ties between the two countries over the past thirty years. The only way to deepen knowledge and understanding of the matter is to examine it from multiple perspectives.

In this summary report, the main characteristics of the Treaty of 1991 will be outlined, followed by three sections: the first will consider the past and the conditions that brought about the signing of such a unique Treaty; the second part will address the present-day situation, including the overall international picture since it is impossible to understand developments in strictly bilateral terms; finally, potential future relations will be analyzed to understand the possibilities moving forward and determine how Lithuania can act to defend both its self-interest and the values for which it fought thirty years ago.


# The 1991 Treaty

On July 29, 1991, the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations between Lithuania and Russia was signed by Vytautas Landsbergis, then the main political figure in Lithuania, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The uniqueness of this Treaty lies not only in the contents of the document itself, whose aim was to lay the foundations and guide the relations between the two states but also in the circumstances in which it was conceived.

Significantly, the Treaty was signed while the Soviet Union was still in existence, after a period when dialogue seemed impossible. Indeed, the blockade on Lithuania and the "Bloody Sunday" events of January 1991 in Vilnius were still fresh in everyone's minds. While Mikhail Gorbachev acted to hold the Soviet Union together, Boris Yeltsin pursued the cause of democracy and freedom and carried out productive, although sometimes painful, negotiations with self-proclaimed independent Lithuania.



As mentioned above, the importance of the Treaty is already evident from the first lines of the text. In the preamble, Russia admitted that in 1940 Lithuania had been forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in violation of Lithuania's sovereignty and international law; no other Baltic state managed to obtain such an acknowledgment in their agreements with Russia. In subsequent parts of the document, the two parties articulated the fundamental principles that were meant to guide relations between them. In article 1, mutual recognition was stated along with a commitment to the principles of non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs. Moreover, both parties agreed to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders as they existed in 1990. In article 2, the two countries recognized each other's right to independently realize their sovereignty in the areas of defense and security, as well as through systems of collective security. On the grounds of this article, Lithuania was able to pursue its integration into the NATO alliance.



One of the key issues that needed to be addressed in the Treaty was the condition of each country's nationals residing in the other, and article 4 confirmed Lithuania's commitment to equal treatment of both its native and non-native residents in granting Lithuanian citizenship. In various subsequent articles, Russia and Lithuania pledged to cooperate in different fields, expressing their desire for mutually beneficial exchange in cultural, scientific, and technological domains, amongst others. Particular

attention was devoted to economic cooperation between the two countries as well as to their integration in the international economic space through specific economic policies.

All the articles of the Treaty were in line with the principles of International Law, sometimes referring directly to articles in the UN Charter, and it represented the starting point for the relations between the two states. It is significant that the relationship between Russia and Lithuania, previously ruined by the violation of international law in 1940, found its new beginning precisely by establishing new legal fundamentals. In fact, the relevance of this Treaty lies in the fact that it is not merely a form of "passive" mutual recognition, but a pledge to actively engage in reciprocal enriching relations between two budding democracies. According to its terms, the entire Treaty was to be re-confirmed every ten years, excepting the preamble and article 1, which remain eternally valid. Consequently, despite recent troubles, the Treaty remains a steady guiding light for current diplomatic relations.

# The Past

Looking at the past is not an attempt to escape the difficulties of today, nor does it involve a nostalgic gaze at a once-bright reality now faded. On the contrary, studying the past is a key element in understanding the present and in facing the future. In other words, to fully understand the relevance of the 1991 Treaty, it is indispensable to be aware of the circumstances that led to its signature.

Professor Michael Morgan illustrated the broader picture behind the 1991 Treaty, underlining its roots in the Final Helsinki Act signed in 1975. Just like the Helsinki Accords strove to unify what the Cold War had broken apart, the Treaty aimed to harmonize the relationship that Bolshevism had damaged, putting into place a dynamic, open, and transparent new European order. The Helsinki Accords reflected a vision of international security not based solely on military might but on mutual trust and the search for peace and legitimacy. All these values were faithfully represented in the 1991 Treaty, which reflected the hope for

Lithuania's integration into a united Europe, a vision that might one day include Russia, too. Frontiers were a key point in the Helsinki Accords, as were cooperation and respect for human rights, and these fundamental principles were reconfirmed in the Treaty. In the time between Leonid Brezhnev, who signed the Final Act, and Mikhail Gorbachev, many of these concepts were revisited and expanded, opening the possibility even more for a future based on shared values. This transition period proves just how much the enforcement of treaty provisions and the realization of plans depends on the personality of the leaders in power. From Brezhnev to Gorbachev to Yeltsin, the state of international security and relations evolved significantly, and the 1991 Treaty needs to be viewed with this historical backdrop in mind.

As pointed out by professor **Dainius Žalimas**, the treaty document fits perfectly within the framework of international law. Moreover, it contains two important concepts that should be highlighted: recognition of the continuity of Lithuania's statehood during the occupation of 1940-1991, which Russia also addressed in the preamble, and the sincere acknowledgment of historical truth. The effort made by both parties to come together and achieve this result makes the Treaty not only important for bilateral relations but also sets an example for how courage, determination, and faith can lead to success.



l.t.r. Vytautas Landsbergis, Emilija Pundžiute Gallois, Danius Žalimas



Vyacheslav Bakhmin

Yet negotiations were not always smooth, as recalled Ambassador Vladimir Jarmolenko. From the moment of the Declaration of the Restoration of Independence, on March 11, 1990, it was a long path toward achieving Lithuania's main objective: official recognition and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. For its part, Russia wanted rights and protections for Russian citizens residing abroad. The Treaty was in fact the result of concessions on both sides. It should also be noted that negotiations were not carried out with Soviet authorities, but with the Russian Federation as a separate legal entity.

Direct witnesses to these events underscore the importance of remembering the circumstances surrounding the signing. As **Egidijus Bičkauskas** recalled, the Treaty was one of many milestones that led not only to the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a territorial entity but also to the disruption of Bolshevism, which had long proved a barrier to restoring democracy. Perhaps it was naïve to hope that the diplomatic relations would remain as friendly forever, and subsequent developments in foreign policy proved that to be the case. But a euphoric atmosphere promising great change dominated at the time, both in Lithuania and in Russia. The system was becoming more and more open and new opportunities were possible, raising hopes for a brighter future.

To **Vyacheslav Bakhmin**, it was clear that after the failed August coup in Vilnius that resulted in tragedy, any attempt to preserve the Soviet Union was doomed. In a rather pessimistic tone, he acknowledged that for a time diplomacy seemed to offer a brighter outlook, but he left the diplomatic service when things started to change in the mid-1990s, with the appointment of Evgenyi Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia. He already sensed that the "window of opportunity" which allowed relations to flourish was closing.

Norway's Ambassador Ole Horpestad admitted that the transition from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin was perceived as worrisome by the entire region, even by countries for whom peaceful coexistence had been the norm. Many of these countries had shown support for the



Baltic States, refusing to recognize their illegal annexation to the Soviet Union and supporting movements for democracy and independence. In this regard, foreign actors long have played a fundamental role in relations in the region, as former US diplomat **Thomas Graham** testified, and Western countries wanted to show support for the independence movement. However, official relations between the West and the Soviet Union were slowly warming after the Cold War, and no one wanted to damage that. As a result, their attitude was sympathetic after the August coup, but ambiguous, as they could offer neither direct military nor economic support. Nevertheless, as Sir Rodric Braithwaite reported, embassies in Moscow suggested openly recognizing Baltic independence and supporting Lithuania as an independent state. Looking back, it is important to pay tribute to those who played an active role in the process. As **Paul Goble** accurately remarked, independence was achieved thanks to the work of many political leaders. In addition, attention should be paid to the Lithuanian diaspora community which kept the country's dream and ideals alive, as well as people in both the West and the Soviet Union who demonstrated against Soviet violence, and all the government officials who assisted Lithuania in the re-establishment of the Lithuanian State.

# The Present

Past Lithuanian-Russian relations were characterized by a positive and optimistic outlook. Regretfully, the same cannot be said about the present. Today, many issues affect the relationship between the two countries, in particular with regards to security issues. Well-known expert in energy and security **Edward Lucas** identified various areas in which Lithuania has shown resilience in face of the Russian threat, ranging from the fight against disinformation to the commitment to energy independence to the creation of a transportation network that would further enhance European integration. Yet while these noble efforts are being pursued, Lithuania must fight against the temptation to give in to Russophobia. It is of the utmost importance that some kind of positive human connection is preserved and that Russians always feel welcome in Lithuania. Broader international issues, and not only bilateral factors, need to be considered when analyzing the current state of affairs. Jeroen Bult pointed out that the current state of relations should be viewed through the lens of recent developments in Russia's policy toward

other neighbors. There is no doubt that since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Russia's increasingly aggressive attitude overall, relations have inevitably become colder and more cautious. Even if all concerned would prefer a more constructive dialogue, this has not always been possible.

When assessing the relations between Russia and Lithuania, Ambassador Marius Janukonis pointed out the importance of three factors: values and political will, an area in which significant divergence can be noted recently; geography and proximity, which is especially connected



Marius Janukonis

to trade and exchange; and finally, as already mentioned, the relations between people, from tourism to civil society. With regards to this last point, Janukonis referred to the fact that Lithuania has been providing asylum to Russian political opponents. **Ian Bond** broadened the picture by pointing out that Lithuania is now strongly backed up by the European Union (EU) and NATO as it bears the brunt of growing pressure from Russia, a country that seems more interested in having weak and chaotic neighbors to influence or dominate, rather than true dialogue partners. If on the one hand, European integration has a positive effect in the region, on the other hand, Lithuanian-Russian relations risk being held "hostage" to the conflictual relations between the West and Russia, as **Nikolai Petrov** said. He stressed the need for a deeper knowledge of "the other," a higher level of expertise among decision-makers and the personnel in charge of managing such relations. Indeed, a higher level of experience and skill might help participants in the process recognize an eventual new "window of opportunity" and be prepared to take advantage of such an occasion

The experienced journalist and former El Pais Moscow correspondent **Pilar Bonet** took the discourse about the present situation even further, attributing the deterioration of relations between the West and Russia to factors such as current Ukrainian and Belarusian realities and weak democracies at the gates of Europe, both caused and influenced directly by the Kremlin. Bonet warned Western countries against dismissing Lithuanian's preoccupation as excessive Russophobia, a stance



Sergei Medvedev

commonly taken by "distant" neighbors of Russia. Regretfully, at present, relations remain tense and there is little hope for a constructive dialogue in the foreseeable future. However, Lithuania and all European countries must be ready for the opportunity when the time comes, perhaps after Putin's era.

Again, the question arises: how to do so? How to actively prepare the ground for future beneficial negotiations? Undoubtedly, education will play a key role in this process. A prime example is the Belarusian European Humanities University, which continues to function in Vilnius after its forced closure in Minsk. This same idea could be broadened to encompass a wider concept of European identity, with all its diversity. This inclusiveness could give rise to an academic environment where Russian culture would be preserved and protected, both for Russians living abroad to create a vibrant diaspora and for Europeans wanting to take a step toward a deeper understanding of their neighbors.

Professor **Sergej Medvedev** credited Lithuania for preserving Russian culture and for reaching out to the people of Russia. In fact, perhaps unconsciously, Lithuania represented an inspirational and successful example to people fighting for democracy in Russia. It continues to do so today, even if events in Russia took a different turn and set the nation back fifty years. According to Professor Medvedev, the main task for Russia now is to leave behind the myth of empire, to let go of its stance of aggressive isolation which maintains the false narrative of a besieged Eastern fortress threatened by NATO.

There is little doubt that the difficulties in foreign relations are due to both Russia's domestic situation and the wider international context. The Kremlin's aggressive attitude exacerbates the friction between the East and West, already tense because of the ongoing situation at the Eastern border of Russia. Within this framework, Lithuania needs to maintain a stable approach, remaining cautious concerning the actions of the Kremlin, but able to distinguish Putin's regime from Russian civil society, thus avoiding an unproductive Russophobic attitude. The goal is to keep alive relations wherever is possible in order to maintain an ongoing dialogue.

# The Future

Assessing the present situation with lucidity is the first step towards approaching the future with awareness and openness, in order to understand any potential developments. In his analysis of the situation, **Arkady Ostrovsky** underlined how Putin's regime is moving from a consensual autocracy to a real tyranny. Whereas before the threat of repression was a tool to dominate society, actual repression is nowadays the main element on which the regime is based. Once more, though, it must be noted that Russian society is not the Kremlin, and the "brain drain" that Russia is experiencing today, unless the government stops it, could represent a valuable opportunity for the West.



The dialogue with the Kremlin must continue, for the sake of stability and security, but Europe should start focusing its attention on the non-Kremlin side of Russia, which is slowly becoming a majority. It is hard to tell what the future of Russia will look like once Putin's regime is over. In Ostrovsky's view, the transition toward a different regime will most likely not be smooth because Russia lacks the institutions to enable a peaceful shift. Most probably, the first questions that the new regime will have to address will be in the domain of foreign policy. These will include colling the relations with China and possibly reestablishing a friendly dialogue with Europe.

In the meantime, the West should not remain indifferent to Russia's domestic situation. As Andrei Sakharov taught, security and stability need a positive domestic environment as a precondition to thrive, and the defense of human rights and freedom of expression are essential elements. Europe should provide the opportunity, through education in particular, to cultivate a Russian-European identity for the young generation who will be the driving force of the future. Therefore, the West should reach out to non-Kremlin Russia, and offer them a sense of security based on freedom and not on repression.

Dominique Moisi underscored this point, insisting on the need to show Russia that the real threat is China, not NATO or Europe. However, the EU must not give in to Russian pressure either, for example, concerning energy sources. Europe should stick to its core values and invest in nuclear and in green energy, becoming as independent as possible from fossil fuels. In this way, it will be able to maintain a position of strength when warning Russia of the strategic danger of declaring victory too soon. The West speaks from experience after all, as thirty years ago it went through something similar, proclaiming a victory for democracy in the East instead of focusing on the aftermath of the collapse of Communism, which abandoned some countries to extremely challenging periods of development.

Russia's problems are not only on the international front, however. Konstantin Von Eggert described the domestic situation as puzzling as well. Putin is letting all the smartest minds leave the country, in order to control a more passive and maneuverable population. He also offers some stability (some would say "stagnation"?), providing the essentials. However, there are two significant shortcomings in this strategy, which are two sides of the same coin. The first is the complete lack of perspective that Putin's regime offers because there can be no future in that direction. The second shortcoming is the danger of boredom. As happened in the Brezhnev era, the population will eventually grow tired of the status quo, of the never-changing ruling class, and will demand change. Unfortunately, at the moment, the opposition cannot offer any specific and convincing vision of the future that might sway the population. Sometime soon, Putin's regime could collapse. This might lead to a relatively peaceful transition of power, or it could lead to a war, traditional or hybrid, as is happening now on some European borders. In this

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case, the role of Lithuania and indeed of all Europe should be to build resilience, with the same strength that motivated Lithuania in its fight for independence thirty years ago.

According to **Janet Gunn**, a significant breakthrough in relations will not be possible as long as Putin is in charge, because bilateral relations require two active parties. This means that for the time being, no major changes can be expected. However, in the long term, anything is possible. For Lithuania and the rest of Europe, it is fundamental to be ready to face any possible scenario. NATO and the EU should remain strong entities, even if the global focus is shifting towards China. On the other hand, it is in Lithuania's interest that soft power be used as much as possible



Andrew Wood

to defend human rights and help democracy flourish. Firmness and solidarity helped to overcome the Cold War and must be again the two guiding principles moving forward.

The dialogue with the Russian State was never abandoned completely for obvious security reasons, stated Sir Andrew Wood, but what should really be furthered is the dialogue with the Russian people. The future of Russia is doomed if the same unhealthy legal system survives, and as long as Putin keeps Russia trapped in its past, there is no space for development. While waiting for the end of Putin's regime, Lithuania can inspire the Russian people by being an example of historical resilience and showing that change comes to a society when democracy and rule of law are established. Russia has been frozen in a state of anarchy, but small shifts are discernible. The West must be ready to seize the moment and make the most of opportunities for change in the future.

# **Conclusions**

In conclusion, the importance of reflecting on the past, present and future of Russian-Lithuanian relations is self-evident. The Soviet occupation of Lithuania had a devasting effect on the country: mass deportation, the Holocaust, ongoing repression and State violence left a permanent scar on all concerned. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian people showed strength and resilience in defending the ideals of democracy and freedom and fought to obtain a real dialogue. And luckily, their efforts were met halfway with a Russian government that wanted to create bonds based on honesty and justice; for a period of time, the Russian government pursued democracy and admitted its role in past dramatic events.



Vytautas Landsbergis

The sad truth is that the country that negotiated with Lithuania at the time of the Treaty is not the same one that we face today. At present, Russia has reverted to an autocratic regime similar to the ones experienced in past. However, despite its troubling approach in both domestic and international politics, Russia is an important neighbor that cannot be ignored, and all countries must act consequently.

It is important to recognize that Russia is not the Kremlin, that the people are not Vladimir Putin. Putin is a menace to the West and to the entire Russian population, who've never had the chance to live in a real democracy for any length of time. But there have been glimmers of hope in the past, and as this conference has reminded us, looking back at this period of advancement teaches us how solidarity and determination can lead to great achievement. While the West may feel threatened by the current

leadership, the flame that burnt bright in the democratic Russia of the late 1980s and early 1990s is still alive in free-minded citizens and activists, who dream for a better future in Russia, as does Lithuania and the rest of Europe.

Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that Lithuania maintains an official dialogue with Russia for the security and stability of both countries. At the same time, there should be stronger engagement with civil society in all possible domains, from cultural to educational, as was the case three decades ago. Lithuania can show support to the Russian people by welcoming them and by offering them the opportunity to pursue and cultivate their European identity, along with their Russian one. Despite the current distance between the two countries and the many obstacles ahead, both sides must strive to cooperate. Only in this way we will be ready to recognize and pursue the new "window of opportunity" once it opens.

Finally, to answer the question that has guided us through these days of reflection – are good neighborly relations possible? – we can affirm that, at least theoretically, the answer is yes. Progress

has been made in the past, and could be made again, but only if the will exists on both sides. In the present situation and the near future, it is quite unlikely that any constructive dialogue will take place. Nevertheless, there always remains space for cautious and pragmatic optimism. The 1991 Treaty will always be a reference point for the type of good, friendly neighborly relations that we all wish for.

L.t.r. José Maria Robles Fraga, Hans Brask, Ole Horpestad, Vytautas Landsbergis, Robert van Voren, Arja Makkonen, Brigita Baks, Vladimir Jarmolenko



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# **List of Speakers**

### **Grigory Amnuel**

Grigory Amnuel is a filmmaker, producer and politician. He is the author of more than 30 documentaries, and a laureate and award winner at international film festivals.

### **Vyacheslav Bakhmin**

Chairman of the Board of the Moscow Sakharov Center, former political prisoner and diplomat

### **Egidijus Bičkauskas**

Signatory to the Act of the Reinstatement of Independence of Lithuania, subsequently representative of Lithuania to Russia and member of the Lithuanian parliament

### **Ian Bond**

Russia expert, former Ambassador to Latvia, Director of Foreign Policy, European Center for Reform

### **Pilar Bonet**

Freelance analyst, El País; former Moscow correspondent for El País in 1984-1991, 1992-1997 and 2001-2020.3

### Sir Roderic Braithwaite

Former UK Ambassador to Russia 1988-1992

### Jeroen Bult

Dutch historian, specialized in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Germany

### **Konstantin von Eggert**

Iournalist, Deutsche Welle

### **Paul Goble**

Former official at the US State Department, expert on (post-) Soviet issues, writer and blogger

### **Thomas Graham**

Former official at the US State Department, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

### **lanet Gunn**

Former research analyst in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office specializing on the USSR and Central Europe.

### **Ole Horpestad**

Norwegian Ambassador to Lithuania

### **Marius Janukonis**

Director, Communications and Cultural Diplomacy Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Former Lithuanian Ambassador to Ukraine

### **Vladimir Jarmolenko**

Ambassador, former Lithuanian politician, (1990 – 1992), member of the negotiation team on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania

### **Vytautas Landsbergis**

Lithuanian politician and former Member of the European Parliament. He was the first Head of Parliament of Lithuania after its independence declaration from the Soviet Union.

### **Šarunas Liekis**

Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, VDU

### **Edward Lucas**

Journalist at The Economist

### Sergei Medvedev

Professor, Moscow Free University

### **Dominic Moïsi**

Political scientist and writer. Co-founder of the Paris-based Institut Français des Relations Internationales

### Mike Morgan

Professor at University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill

### **James Nixey**

Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, London

### **Arkady Ostrovsky**

Iournalist at The Economist

### Nikolai Petrov

Senior research fellow at Chatham House and professor of political science in Moscow

# **Emilija Pundžiute Gallois**

Expert on Russia, Science Po, Paris

### Sir Andrew Wood

Former UK Ambassador to Russia, 1995-2000

### Dainius Žalimas

Former President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, Dean of the Faculty of Law of Vytautas Magnus University

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