




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**REPORT
ON THE RESULTS
OF THE ALL-UKRAINIAN
SURVEY**
2023





Conducted by



КИЇВСЬКИЙ МІЖНАРОДНИЙ ІНСТИТУТ СОЦІОЛОГІЇ
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INFORMATION ABOUT THE SURVEY

The All-Ukrainian survey was conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February 2023, commissioned by Andrei Sakharov Research Centre for Democratic Development. The survey was conducted as part of a regular KIIS Omnibus. The main stages of the survey included the programming of the questionnaire (the OCA for CATI software was used), generation of mobile phone numbers, conducting interviews with respondents, quality control of the work done, preparation of the final data array, statistical weighting, preparation of the analytical report.

The survey was conducted by the CATI-method (computer-assisted telephone interview). According to the KIIS survey conducted in July 2021 by face-to-face interviews based on a random sample, 96% of adult residents of Ukraine had personal mobile phones. To conduct the all-Ukrainian survey, mobile phone numbers for all major mobile operators of Ukraine were randomly generated at the initial stage. The share of generated numbers per mobile operator was approximately proportional to the share of mobile numbers per mobile operator in general (according to KIIS surveys). To eliminate invalid numbers from the generated database, an “invisible” SMS message was sent to the generated numbers. Then the interviewers called the generated numbers and invited the respondents who answered the call to take part in the survey. The survey was conducted only with respondents aged 18 years and older and only with those who lived in the territory controlled by Ukraine on February 23, 2022 (residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were not controlled by Ukraine before February 24, 2022, were not included in the sample, but residents of territories occupied by Russia after February 24, 2022 were included in the sample). Residents of Ukraine who left the country after February 24, 2022 were not interviewed. The interview was conducted in Ukrainian or Russian at the respondent’s choice.

After conducting the planned number of productive (complete) interviews, the distribution of respondents in the sample by macroregion of residence (West, Center, South, East - see details below), type of settlement (urban or rural), gender and age was compared with official statistical sources. The respondent in the interview reported his place of residence until February 24, 2022, as well as his current (at the time of the interview) place of residence. We used the place of residence until February 24, 2022 for further proceedings. The distribution of the entire adult population by macroregions and type of settlement was determined on the basis of data from the Central Election Commission on the results of the 2019 parliamentary elections (by the number of registered voters). The gender and age structure was determined according to the data of the State Statistics Service as of January 1, 2021. To bring the sample structure in line with the structure of the population of Ukraine as a whole, special statistical weights were constructed. In addition, these weights take into account the different probability of getting different respondents into the sample (depending on the number of different mobile numbers that a respondent has).

The composition of the macroregions: the Western macroregion – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Transcarpathian, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi regions; Central macroregion – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions, Kiev; Southern macroregion – Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odessa regions; Eastern macroregion – Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkiv regions.

The field stage of the study lasted from February 14 to February 22, 2023. 2002 interviews were conducted.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of the all-Ukrainian sample of 2002 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) does not exceed:

- 2.4% for indicators close to 50%,
- 2.1% for indicators close to 25 or 75%,
- 1.5% for indicators close to 10 or 90%,
- 1.1% for indicators close to 5 or 95%.

In the report below, some data are given in the context of the macroregion and the type of settlement. For the calculations, we used the macroregion and the type of settlement where the respondents lived until February 24, 2022. In the case of respondents with different income levels, the categories mean the following: “very low” level means households that do not have enough money even for food; “low” – households which have enough money for food, but no longer have enough for clothes; “middle” – households which have enough money for food, and for clothes, but not enough to purchase some expensive things (TV, etc.); “high” – households which can buy some expensive things or can afford everything. Also in the report, for convenience, the answer “no opinion” means respondents who could not or refused to answer the questionnaire question.

We also draw your attention to the fact that for some demographic categories there is an “intersection”: for example, younger respondents are more affluent and educated. This should be taken into account when interpreting the results presented in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. You can see in more detail such “intersections” (as well as errors for individual categories) in Appendix A.

In addition, for general understanding of the specifics of conducting surveys under conditions of war, we recommend reading the presentation of the President of KIIS, Prof. V. Paniotto, which was prepared for the conference “The Future of Social Research in Russia and Ukraine” (Delmenhorst, Germany, September 2022)¹.

¹Challenges of surveys in Ukraine under conditions of war // <https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1137&page=3>

MAIN SURVEY RESULTS

CITIZENSHIP OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF THE POPULATION

- The majority of respondents – 60% – are inclined to the option that the civil rights of Ukrainian citizens who continued to live in the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014, should be restored only after exams/tests. Almost half as many respondents (34%) are of the opinion that it is necessary to restore all their civil rights as citizens of Ukraine without exams/tests;
- Only 12% of respondents believe that persons who arrived to the occupied territories after 2014 should simply obtain Ukrainian citizenship without additional conditions. But the tough solution to the issue – deportation – is supported by 31%. Most of the respondents – 51% – believe that it is possible to allow them to live in Ukraine as non-citizens with subsequent citizenship after fulfilling all the conditions.

CRIMEA

- Restoring control over all territories except for Crimea and leaving Crimea under Russian control (without official recognition) together with postponing the issue for the future is supported by 31% of respondents, 63% do not support it (this is a conditional scenario of “postponing the issue for the future”);
- Higher (41%) is the support for the conditional scenario of “UN protectorate”, when Crimea receives a special status and is not controlled by either Russia or Ukraine, although against it – 52%;
- In the case of the conditional scenario “returning Crimea, but giving up reparations”, we see only 24% support with 69% of those who are against it.

LANGUAGE ISSUES

- 93% of respondents believe that all citizens of Ukraine should know the Ukrainian language;
- 47% believe that languages should be protected for all national minorities, and another 35% support the protection of all minorities except for the Russian one.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

- 93% of respondents primarily blame Russia, although there are different opinions – who exactly is guilty in Russia. Thus, 35% consider the entire leadership of Russia to be guilty, and 24% blame personally V. Putin. Another 20% consider the entire Russian people to be guilty. Also, 12% speak about the whole society, except for individual citizens who have taken an anti-war position. 2% consider the Russian society, except for the opposition, to be guilty. At the same time, 2% of respondents primarily blame the West, 1% blame Ukraine itself;

- Even after the war, according to 77% of respondents, Russia will not cease to be a threat to Ukraine. 18% believe that it will no longer be a threat;
- If we talk about future relations, 57% are in favor of maximum political isolation of Russia, another 30% are in favor of neutral relations with certain restrictions. Only 9% want to see equal neighborly relations;
- 74% of respondents would like certain changes in Russia after the military defeat. Among them, the most – 40% – would like to divide Russia into several independent states. 23% would like to change the political regime to a democratic one, along with denazification and demilitarization of Russia. Another 12% simply want to change the political regime to a democratic one without denazification, demilitarization, etc.

SYMBOLS OF RUSSIAN CULTURE IN THE PUBLIC SPACE

- The majority of respondents – 73% – support the elimination of symbols of Russian culture from the public space of Ukraine. 23% of respondents are against it.

RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE AFTER THE VICTORY


- The absolute majority of respondents (80%) believe that the current leadership of Ukraine will adhere to the basic rules of democratic governance after the victory. Only 15% do not think so. In general, these indicators are consistent with a high level of trust / approval of the actions of the authorities, which are recorded after the invasion;
- At the same time, respondents are less confident that there are no threats to press freedom. Thus, 54% believe that after the victory there will be no such threat, but 39% consider the threat real;
- 83% of respondents agree that corruption is the main threat to the country's recovery. Only 14% do not think so;
- Respondents' opinions regarding the role of veterans after the victory were divided. Slightly more than half of the respondents (54%) believe that they should take part in the political process on an equal basis with other citizens. At the same time, 41% are in favor of granting them certain privileges.

SECTION I. CITIZENSHIP OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF THE POPULATION

1.1. Civil rights of citizens of Ukraine who continued to reside in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014

The majority of respondents – 60% – are inclined to the option that the civil rights of Ukrainian citizens who continued to live in the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014, **should be restored only after exams / tests**. Almost half as many respondents (34%) are of the opinion that it is necessary to restore all their civil rights as citizens of Ukraine without exams and tests.

Chart 1.1.1. Restoration of civil rights of citizens of Ukraine who continued to reside in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Almost among all socio-demographic categories, there are more of those who spoke in favor of conducting examinations/tests for the resumption of civil rights. Only among respondents who chose Russian for the interview (not to be confused with the use of the Russian language in everyday life), 55% were in favor of the renewal of rights without exams/tests. At the same time, a significant number of such respondents - 37% - support exams/ tests.

The interview language factor is partly determined by the region, since 76.5% of those who chose Russian for the interview live in the southern and eastern regions. And according to the survey results, the share of those who support exams/tests is decreasing from 71% in the west to 51% in the east. At the same time, the share of those who support the renewal of rights without exams/tests is growing from 25% to 42%.

Table 1.1.1. Restoration of civil rights of Ukrainian citizens who continued to live in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014: socio-demographic categories

100%	Without exams/tests	Exams/tests are needed	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)			
Western	25	71	4
Central	34	61	5
Southern	40	52	8
Eastern	42	51	7
Gender			
Man	32	62	6
Woman	36	58	6
Age			
18-29	29	67	3
30-39	38	60	2
40-49	36	57	6
50-59	32	63	5
60-69	34	58	8
70+	34	54	12
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)			
Village	29	65	6
Town up to 20 thousand	39	57	4
City 20-99 thousand	35	59	6
Cities 100 thousand and more	36	57	6
What language was chosen for the interview			
Ukrainian	31	63	6
Russian	55	37	8
Education			
Complete secondary/lower	36	57	7
Secondary professional	34	60	7
Higher	33	62	4
Household income level			
Very low	43	48	9
Low	40	53	7
Middle	30	66	5
High	30	65	4

1.2 Status of persons who arrived in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014

Only 12% of respondents believe that persons who arrived in the occupied territories after 2014 should simply obtain Ukrainian citizenship without additional conditions. But a tough solution to the issue – deportation – is supported by 31%. **Most of the respondents – 51% – believe that it is possible to allow them to live in Ukraine as non-citizens with subsequent citizenship after fulfilling all the conditions.**

Chart 1.2.1. Status of persons who arrived in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Among all categories, a minority (maximum – 22% among those who chose Russian for an interview) believes that such persons should be granted citizenship unconditionally. The main discussion is about granting the status of non-citizens or deportation, and in all cases there are still more of those who spoke in favor of granting the status of non-citizens.

Table 1.2.1. The status of persons who arrived in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014: socio-demographic categories

100%	To grant citizenship	Non-citizens	Deportation	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)				
Western	10	55	30	6
Central	8	49	37	6
Southern	16	49	28	7
Eastern	19	48	27	6
Gender				
Man	11	48	36	5
Woman	13	52	27	7
Age				
18-29	7	59	31	3
30-39	11	52	35	2
40-49	14	46	34	7
50-59	11	51	30	7
60-69	13	48	31	7
70+	15	48	24	12
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)				
Village	11	53	30	6
Town up to 20 thousand	17	56	22	6
City 20-99 thousand	11	49	31	9
Cities 100 thousand and more	12	48	36	5
What language was chosen for the interview				
Ukrainian	11	51	32	6
Russian	22	45	24	9
Education				
Complete secondary/lower	15	54	24	7
Secondary professional	14	47	31	8
Higher	9	51	36	4
Household income level				
Very low	21	39	25	16
Low	15	49	28	8
Middle	9	53	35	4
High	10	53	34	3


SECTION II. CRIMEA

2.1. General context: general readiness for territorial concessions and acceptability of giving up Crimea

In the same survey, KIIS asked its standard question about the general readiness for territorial concessions in exchange for peace. KIIS has been asking this question since May 2022.


As you can see, **only 9% are generally ready for territorial concessions, and 87% do not agree to give up territories in exchange for peace.** The situation has hardly changed since May 2022.

Chart 2.1.1. General readiness for territorial concessions in exchange for peace



During 2022-2023, KIIS asked questions about the status of Crimea in different formulations. Below is the question that KIIS asked in July 2022. In general, **even in the difficult July of 2022, only 12% of respondents were ready for the recognition of Crimea as part of Russia.**

Chart 2.1.2. Acceptability of recognition of Crimea as part of Russia (July 2022)



2.2. Attitude to different options for resolving the issue of Crimea to end the war

Now it is necessary to consider how respondents feel about other options for resolving the status of Crimea. As you can see, the majority of respondents are against the proposed scenarios for resolving the issue of Crimea, but at the same time the boundaries for discussion are noticeably wider than in the case of general readiness for territorial compromises.

Thus, **31% of respondents support the restoration of control over all territories except for Crimea and keeping Crimea under Russian control** (without official recognition), along with postponing the issue for the future, and **63% do not support it** (this is a conditional scenario of “postponing the issue for the future”). **Support (41%) for the conditional scenario of “UN protectorate” is higher, when Crimea receives a special status and is not controlled by either Russia or Ukraine, although 52% are against.**

In the case of the conditional scenario “to return the Crimea, but to give up reparations”, we see only 24% support with 69% of those who are against.

Chart 2.2.1. Attitude to different options for solving the issue of Crimea



Question: Would you support or not support the following options for ending the war if they lead to its speedy end.

The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Among all categories, there are more of those who oppose these scenarios. It can be noted that the share of those who are ready to “postpone” the issue of Crimea is increasing as we move from west to east, and there are more such people among those who chose Russian for an interview. But still, even among them there are more respondents who do not support the “postponement” of the issue. For example, in the east, 37% are ready to “postpone” the issue of Crimea and 55% are not ready (in the west, the ratio is 29% versus 65%).

Table 2.2.1. Attitude to different options for solving the Crimean issue: socio-demographic categories

%	«Postpone for the future»		«UN Protectorate»		«Return Crimea, refusal of reparations»	
	«For»	«Against»	«For»	«Against»	«For»	«Against»
	Region (until 24/02/22)					
Western	29	65	41	53	24	69
Central	28	66	40	54	25	69
Southern	34	61	42	50	23	70
Eastern	37	55	40	53	26	67
Gender						
Man	28	67	39	56	27	68
Woman	33	60	42	49	22	70


%	«Postpone for the future»		«UN Protectorate»		«Return Crimea, refusal of reparations»	
	«For»	«Against»	«For»	«Against»	«For»	«Against»
	Age					
18-29	31	68	46	52	28	71
30-39	34	63	43	53	29	69
40-49	28	65	44	50	24	68
50-59	30	63	37	54	19	71
60-69	29	62	37	54	19	72
70+	33	56	35	50	25	61
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)						
Village	33	61	38	53	24	69
Town up to 20 thousand	33	59	44	49	24	71
City 20-99 thousand	33	60	39	53	17	75
Cities 100 thousand and more	28	67	43	52	27	67
What language was chosen for the interview						
Ukrainian	30	64	40	53	24	70
Russian	40	53	43	48	26	65
Education						
Complete secondary/ lower	33	61	37	53	25	66
Professional secondary	33	58	40	51	21	71
Higher	29	67	44	53	26	69
Household income level						
Very low	36	53	32	45	26	53
Low	32	61	41	51	19	73
Middle	30	65	43	52	30	66
High	29	67	40	56	23	72

SECTION III. LANGUAGE ISSUES

3.1. Obligatory knowledge of the Ukrainian language for all Ukrainian citizens

93% of respondents believe that all citizens of Ukraine should know the Ukrainian language.

Chart 3.1.1. Should citizens of Ukraine, regardless of the region, know the Ukrainian language



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. There are slightly fewer people in the east and south who agree that all citizens should know the Ukrainian language, but even in these regions the indicators are 91% and 88%, respectively. Also, among respondents who chose Russian for an interview, 81% believe that all citizens should know Ukrainian.

Table 3.1.1 Should citizens of Ukraine, regardless of the region, know the Ukrainian language: socio-demographic categories

100%	Agree	Disagree	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)			
Western	97	2	1
Central	94	5	0
Southern	88	11	2
Eastern	91	7	2
Gender			
Man	92	7	1
Woman	94	5	1
Age			
18-29	94	6	0
30-39	94	6	0
40-49	94	5	1
50-59	93	7	1
60-69	91	7	2
70+	90	7	3
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)			
Village	94	5	1
Town up to 20 thousand	92	6	2
City 20-99 thousand	90	8	2
Cities 100 thousand and more	93	7	1
What language was chosen for the interview			
Ukrainian	95	5	1
Russian	81	16	3
Education			
Complete secondary/lower	89	9	2
Secondary professional	92	7	1
Higher	95	4	1
Household income level			
Very low	87	12	2
Low	93	6	1
Middle	93	6	1
High	95	4	1


3.2. Attitude to the protection of national minority languages

In general, respondents are favorable to the protection of national minority languages. So, **if we don't talk about Russians, 82% would support the idea of protection through a system of special classes.** But among them, 35% exclude Russians from protection.

At the moment, 47% are generally ready to provide protection for the language of the Russian national minority. But, it should be borne in mind that the "Russian national minority" is not identical in public opinion to the "Russian-speaking". Most likely, the respondents support local protection in the territories with the concentration of the "national minority", and not the national policy. For understanding, according to the same survey, only 1.5% of respondents identify themselves as "Russians by nationality". Since ordinary residents also feel this (that is, they feel how friends, neighbors, etc. identify themselves), they largely project this protection onto localized communities.

Moreover, in the same survey there was a question whether it is necessary to teach Russian in schools at all. Among those who answered "for all minorities", 35% believe that Russian should not be learned at school at all.

Chart 3.2.1. Should minority languages be protected, for example, through a system of special classes at school



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Those who chose Russian for the interview insist most on "all minorities".

Table 3.2.1. Should minority languages be protected, for example, through a system of special classes at school: socio-demographic categories

100%	For all	Except Russian	No	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)				
Western	43	38	11	8
Central	45	39	13	3
Southern	52	30	13	5
Eastern	53	27	14	6
Gender				
Man	49	34	12	5
Woman	46	36	13	5
Age				
18-29	43	42	12	3
30-39	39	37	22	2
40-49	55	31	9	5
50-59	54	32	9	5
60-69	51	33	9	7
70+	43	35	12	10
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)				
Village	41	39	14	6
Town up to 20 thousand	52	33	9	6
City 20-99 thousand	48	36	12	5
Cities 100 thousand and more	51	33	13	4
What language was chosen for the interview				
Ukrainian	44	38	13	5
Russian	69	15	10	6
Education				
Complete secondary/lower	40	40	12	8
Secondary professional	49	33	12	7
Higher	51	34	13	2
Household income level				
Very low	44	35	12	9
Low	50	34	10	6
Middle	47	34	15	4
High	44	39	13	4


SECTION IV. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

4.1. Responsibility for the outbreak of war

93% of respondents primarily blame Russia, although there are different opinions – who exactly is guilty in Russia. Thus, 35% consider the entire leadership of Russia to be guilty, and 24% blame V. Putin personally. Another 20% consider the entire Russian people to be guilty. Also, 12% speak about the whole society, except for individual citizens who have taken an anti-war position. 2% of respondents consider the Russian society, except for the opposition, to be guilty.

At the same time, 2% of respondents primarily blame the West, 1% blame Ukraine itself.

Chart 4.1.1. Who is primarily responsible for the beginning of the invasion



Question: Who, in your opinion, is primarily responsible for the start of Russia's war against Ukraine?
Choose only one answer.

The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Among all categories, the absolute majority accuses Russia and mainly the entire leadership or personally V. Putin.


Table 4.1.1. Who is primarily responsible for the beginning of the invasion

100%	All the leadership of Russia	Personally V. Putin	All Russian people	Society except for individuals citizens	Society except for opposition	Ukraine	The West	Otherwise	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)									
Western	34	21	23	14	1	2	1	1	4
Central	36	24	22	11	3	1	1	1	2
Southern	33	26	17	11	5	2	3	1	2
Eastern	36	27	15	11	1	1	5	1	5
Gender									
Man	33	22	23	14	2	1	2	1	2
Woman	36	25	18	10	3	1	2	1	3
Age									
18-29	30	21	24	16	4	0	1	0	2
30-39	36	23	18	14	2	2	2	0	2
40-49	37	18	22	14	3	2	3	1	2
50-59	35	22	20	13	2	0	2	1	4
60-69	36	28	20	8	1	2	2	0	3
70+	35	34	17	6	1	2	2	1	3
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)									
Village	36	26	22	8	3	2	0	0	4
Town up to 20 thousand	35	26	16	11	2	2	3	3	2
City 20-99 thousand	37	21	20	14	1	1	3	0	3
Cities 100 thousand and more	33	23	20	15	2	1	3	1	2
What language was chosen for the interview									
Ukrainian	35	23	21	12	3	1	1	1	3
Russian	37	27	11	10	2	3	6	1	4
Education									
Complete secondary / lower	31	32	21	7	1	1	2	0	5
Professional secondary	36	27	19	9	1	2	2	1	3
Higher	36	18	20	16	4	2	2	1	1
Household income level									
Very low	29	40	13	4	1	1	3	1	7
Low	37	28	17	8	2	2	3	1	3
Middle	34	20	24	16	2	1	1	0	2
High	35	19	21	15	5	2	1	0	2

4.2. The threat from Russia after the war

Even after the war, according to 77% of respondents, Russia will not cease to be a threat to Ukraine. 18% believe that it will no longer be a threat.

Chart 4.2.1. Will Russia cease to be a threat to Ukraine after the war



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Among all respondents, the majority is confident that the threat from Russia will remain. Even in the south and east, respectively 73% and 71% of respondents think so.

Table 4.2.1. Will Russia cease to be a threat to Ukraine after the war: socio-demographic categories


100%	Will cease	Will not cease	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)			
Western	16	80	5
Central	15	79	6
Southern	22	73	5
Eastern	22	71	7
Gender			
Man	16	78	5
Woman	19	75	6
Age			
18-29	19	77	4
30-39	18	80	2
40-49	18	77	5
50-59	15	78	7
60-69	19	73	8
70+	17	75	8
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)			
Village	21	72	7
Town up to 20 thousand	18	77	5
City 20-99 thousand	15	79	6
Cities 100 thousand and more	16	79	5
What language was chosen for the interview			
Ukrainian	17	78	5
Russian	23	69	8
Education			
Complete secondary /lower	23	70	7
Professional secondary	22	72	6
Higher	13	83	4
Household income level			
Very low	20	66	14
Low	20	74	6
Middle	17	79	4
High	16	80	4

4.3. Relations with Russia after the war

Back in February 2022, before the invasion, according to KIIS, 48% wanted Ukraine and Russia to be independent friendly states without borders, visas, customs, etc. (and in February 2014 the indicator was 68%).

Now, **57% are in favor of maximum political isolation of Russia, another 30% are in favor of neutral relations with certain restrictions.** Only 9% want to see equal neighborly relations.

Chart 4.3.1. What should be the relations with Russia after the war



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. An absolute minority among all categories would like good-neighborly relations. The question is more about isolation or neutral relations with restrictions. Thus, the share of those who advocate isolation is decreasing if we move from west to east, respectively from 62% to 44%. At the same time, more people (38%) in the east advocate neutral relations than 26% in the west. Also, older respondents and those who chose Russian for the interview are “softer” in their opinions.


Table 4.3.1. What should be the relations with Russia after the war: socio-demographic categories

100%	Isolation	Neutral	Neighborly	To unite	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)					
Western	62	26	10	0	3
Central	62	28	6	0	3
Southern	53	35	9	0	3
Eastern	44	38	13	0	4
Gender					
Man	57	30	9	0	3
Woman	58	31	8	0	3
Age					
18-29	70	25	5	0	0
30-39	67	27	5	0	1
40-49	56	34	6	0	4
50-59	53	34	8	0	5
60-69	52	32	10	1	5
70+	43	32	20	0	5
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)					
Village	57	31	8	0	4
Town up to 20 thousand	56	31	11	0	2
City 20-99 thousand	56	31	10	0	3
Cities 100 thousand and more	58	30	8	0	3
What language was chosen for the interview					
Ukrainian	61	29	7	0	3
Russian	35	40	18	0	6
Education					
Complete secondary/lower	56	27	11	0	6
Professional secondary	52	35	11	0	3
Higher	62	30	6	0	2
Household income level					
Very low	52	23	15	0	9
Low	52	31	12	0	4
Middle	59	33	7	0	2
High	65	28	5	0	1

4.4. Necessary changes in Russia after the military defeat

Respondents' opinions regarding the necessary changes in Russia after the defeat were divided. On the one hand, only 14% believe that nothing should be done at all. On the other hand, **74% would like certain changes in Russia. Among them, the most – 40% – would like to divide Russia into several independent states.** 23% would like to change the political regime to a democratic one, along with denazification, demilitarization, etc. of Russia. Another 12% simply want to change the political regime to a democratic one without denazification, demilitarization, etc.

Chart 4.4.1. Necessary changes in Russia after the military defeat



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Among all categories, the majority believes that Russia needs certain changes. At the same time, it should be noted that the share of such people decreases as we move from west to east, respectively from 79% to 63%, mainly due to a decrease in the share of those who would like to divide Russia (from 48% to 32%).

In addition, among respondents who chose Russian for interviews, 63% expect certain consequences for Russia. 76% of respondents who chose the Ukrainian language also think so. Again, mainly due to a larger share of those who want to see Russia divided – 41% versus 29%.

We also note that democratization with denazification, demilitarization, etc. is more supported by more educated respondents. Thus, among respondents with higher education, 30% support this option, and among respondents with secondary professional education – 19%, with a complete secondary education or lower – 15%. It can also be seen that more affluent respondents believe to a greater extent that Russia needs changes and more often insist on tougher options. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that there is a connection between the level of income and the language chosen for the interview, as well as with the level of education. Less well-off respondents more often chose Russian and have a lower education (see Appendix A).


Table 4.4.1. Necessary changes in Russia after the military defeat: socio-demographic categories

100%	Democratization without demilitarization, etc.	Democratization with demilitarization, etc.	Dividing	Nothing needs to be done	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)					
Western	12	19	48	10	11
Central	11	26	40	13	9
Southern	13	24	35	17	12
Eastern	10	20	32	19	19
Gender					
Man	13	22	46	10	10
Woman	11	24	35	17	13
Age					
18-29	15	24	42	12	6
30-39	13	22	42	13	9
40-49	12	22	39	12	15
50-59	8	28	36	14	14
60-69	10	22	42	14	12
70+	11	19	37	19	14
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)					
Village	14	20	37	17	13
Town up to 20 thousand	13	22	39	14	12
City 20-99 thousand	10	23	37	14	15
Cities 100 thousand and more	10	25	43	12	10
What language was chosen for the interview					
Ukrainian	12	23	41	13	11
Russian	13	22	29	18	19
Education					
Complete secondary / lower	11	15	41	16	18
Professional secondary	13	19	38	19	12
Higher	11	30	41	10	8
Household income level					
Very low	9	12	32	25	23
Low	12	21	35	19	13
Middle	13	24	43	11	10
High	11	28	46	7	8

SECTION V. SYMBOLS OF RUSSIAN CULTURE IN THE PUBLIC SPACE

Most respondents – 73% – support the elimination of symbols of Russian culture from the public space of Ukraine. 23% of respondents are against it.

Chart 5.1. Attitude to the elimination of Russian culture from the public space of Ukraine



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Among all categories, there are more of those who advocate the elimination of symbols of Russian culture. Residents of the south and east, older respondents, less educated and poorer respondents, as well as those who chose Russian for the interview are slightly “softer” in their views. But even, for example, in the east 63% support liquidation (32% do not support it), and the indicator among those who chose Russian for an interview is 52% (43% do not support it).

Table 5.1. Attitude to the elimination of Russian culture from the public space of Ukraine: socio-demographic categories

100%	Support	Don't support	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)			
Western	78	18	4
Central	76	21	2
Southern	68	28	4
Eastern	63	32	5
Gender			
Man	76	20	4
Woman	71	26	3
Age			
18-29	75	21	4
30-39	78	20	2
40-49	74	24	2
50-59	74	23	2
60-69	74	22	4
70+	60	33	7
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)			
Village	73	25	2
Town 20 thousand	71	25	4
City 20-99 thousand	71	22	7
Cities 100 thousand and more	74	22	3
What language was chosen for the interview			
Ukraine	76	21	3
Russian	52	43	5
Education			
Complete secondary/ lower	67	28	5
Professional secondary	68	28	4
Higher	80	18	2
Household income level			
Very low	56	38	6
Low	67	31	3
Middle	78	19	4
High	81	16	3


SECTION VI. RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE AFTER THE VICTORY

6.1. Adherence to the basic rules of democratic governance and the threat to freedom of the press even after the victory

The absolute majority of respondents (80%) believe that the current leadership of Ukraine will adhere to the basic rules of democratic governance after the victory. Only 15% don't think so. In general, these indicators are consistent with a high level of trust / approval of the actions of the authorities, which are recorded after the invasion.

At the same time, respondents are less confident that there are no threats to press freedom. 54% believe that there will be no such threat after the victory, but 39% consider the threat real.

Chart 6.1.1. Will the leadership of Ukraine adhere to the basic rules of democratic governance and is there a threat to freedom of the press after the victory



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. In general, different categories of the population have similar views on these issues.


Table 6.1.1. Will the leadership of Ukraine adhere to the basic rules of democratic governance and is there a threat to freedom of the press after the victory: socio-demographic categories

%	Democratic governance		Threat to freedom of the press	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Region (until 24/02/22)				
Western	79	15	42	53
Central	82	13	38	55
Southern	77	18	38	56
Eastern	80	14	37	54
Gender				
Man	78	18	41	53
Woman	81	13	38	55
Age				
18-29	83	12	38	58
30-39	83	14	43	51
40-49	79	16	41	54
50-59	80	16	31	63
60-69	78	17	40	50
70+	74	15	39	49
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)				
Village	80	14	38	55
Town up to 20 thousand	79	16	42	49
City 20-99 thousand	79	17	40	54
Cities 100 thousand and more	80	15	38	55
What language was chosen for the interview				
Ukrainian	81	15	39	55
Russian	74	18	41	50
Education				
Complete secondary / lower	80	14	41	50
Professional secondary	76	18	37	55
Higher	83	14	39	56
Household income level				
Very low	67	21	40	46
Low	75	19	43	49
Middle	84	13	37	58
High	83	12	36	59

6.2. Corruption as the main obstacle to the country's recovery

83% of respondents agree that corruption is the main threat to the country's recovery. Only 14% do not think so.

Chart 6.2.1. Will corruption become the main obstacle to the country's recovery



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Among all categories, the absolute majority are worried about corruption.


Table 6.2.1. Will corruption become the main obstacle to the country's recovery: socio-demographic categories

100%	Yes	No	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)			
Western	82	15	4
Central	83	15	2
Southern	84	14	1
Eastern	84	13	3
Gender			
Man	83	14	2
Woman	83	15	2
Age			
18-29	77	20	3
30-39	82	16	2
40-49	84	13	3
50-59	86	12	3
60-69	87	12	1
70+	84	12	4
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)			
Village	82	16	3
Town up to 20 thousand	86	11	3
City 20-99 thousand	84	14	2
Cities 100 thousand and more	83	15	2
What language was chosen for the interview			
Ukrainian	83	15	2
Russian	86	11	3
Education			
Complete secondary / lower	78	18	5
Professional secondary	81	16	2
Higher	88	12	1
Household income level			
Very low	85	13	2
Low	85	13	2
Middle	83	15	1
High	80	16	4

6.3. The role of veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the socio-political life of Ukraine after the end of the war

Respondents' opinions regarding the role of veterans after the victory were divided. Slightly more than half of the respondents (54%) believe that they should take part in the political process on an equal basis with other citizens. At the same time, 41% are in favor of granting them certain privileges.

Chart 6.3.1. The role of veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the socio-political life of Ukraine after the end of the war



The table below shows the data in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. Opinions are divided among all categories, but in most cases, there are more of those who are inclined to the option that veterans should take part on an equal basis with others.

Table 6.3.1. The role of veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the socio-political life of Ukraine after the end of the war: socio-demographic categories

100%	Equal basis	Privileges	No opinion
Region (until 24/02/22)			
Western	44	49	6
Central	60	36	4
Southern	55	40	6
Eastern	56	39	5
Gender			
Man	56	39	5
Woman	52	43	5
Age			
18-29	51	43	5
30-39	55	41	4
40-49	55	39	5
50-59	62	33	5
60-69	50	45	5
70+	48	45	7
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)			
Village	44	51	5
Town up to 20 thousand	52	42	6
City 20-99 thousand	58	38	4
Cities 100 thousand and more	61	34	5
What language was chosen for the interview			
Ukrainian	53	42	5
Russian	61	33	6
Education			
Complete secondary/ lower	42	51	7
Secondary professional	52	43	5
Higher	62	34	4
Household income level			
Very low	43	47	10
Low	50	44	6
Middle	55	40	4
High	62	34	3

APPENDIX A. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Table A1. Profile of respondents in general and respondents of individual regions (where they lived before 24/02/22)

100%	Whole sample	West	Centre	South	East
Number of respondents	2002	379	833	506	284
Error	2.4	5.5	3.7	4.8	6.4
Region (until 24/02/22)					
Western	27	---	---	---	---
Central	35	---	---	---	---
Southern	25	---	---	---	---
Eastern	13	---	---	---	---
Gender					
Man	45	46	45	45	45
Woman	55	54	55	55	55
Age					
18-29	16	18	16	15	14
30-39	20	20	20	20	20
40-49	18	18	18	18	18
50-59	17	17	17	17	16
60-69	15	15	15	16	15
70+	14	12	14	14	16
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)					
Village	34	51	32	26	19
Town up to 20 thousand	13	9	14	11	19
City 20-99 thousand	11	10	13	7	18
Cities 100 thousand and more	42	30	42	56	44
What language was chosen for the interview					
Ukrainian	87	99	92	78	69
Russian	13	1	8	22	31
Education					
Complete secondary/ lower	25	32	21	24	25
Professional secondary	29	25	29	31	31
Higher	46	43	50	45	44
Non-response	0	0	0	0	0
Household income level					
Very low	6	7	5	8	6
Low	35	27	36	38	46
Middle	36	39	38	33	35
High	21	26	19	21	11
Non-response	1	1	1	1	1

Table A2. Profile of male and female respondents and respondents of certain age categories


100%	Men	Women	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Number of respondents	914	1088	245	394	342	370	396	255
Error	3.6	3.3	6.9	5.4	5.8	5.6	5.4	6.8
Region (until 24/02/22)								
Western	28	27	31	27	27	27	26	24
Central	34	35	34	35	35	35	35	36
Southern	24	25	23	25	25	25	26	25
Eastern	13	13	12	13	13	13	13	16
Gender								
Man	---	---	51	51	49	46	40	32
Woman	---	---	49	49	51	54	60	68
Age								
18-29	18	14	---	---	---	---	---	---
30-39	23	18	---	---	---	---	---	---
40-49	19	17	---	---	---	---	---	---
50-59	17	16	---	---	---	---	---	---
60-69	13	17	---	---	---	---	---	---
70+	10	17	---	---	---	---	---	---
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)								
Village	35	33	37	31	32	35	32	38
Town up to 20 thousand	12	13	10	11	15	12	15	11
City 20-99 thousand	10	12	10	9	12	13	12	12
Cities 100 thousand and more	43	42	42	49	41	40	41	39
What language was chosen for the interview								
Ukrainian	89	87	93	89	88	86	83	85
Russian	11	13	7	11	12	14	17	15
Education								
Complete secondary / lower	28	23	23	20	26	23	31	33
Professional secondary	28	29	22	21	29	34	35	33
Higher	44	47	55	59	45	42	34	34
Non-response	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Household income level								
Very low	4	8	1	2	5	8	11	15
Low	30	40	16	28	38	37	51	46
Middle	42	32	46	43	39	34	26	27
High	24	18	36	27	18	18	11	10
Non-response	1	1	0	0	1	2	2	2

Table A3. Profile of respondents-residents of certain types of settlements (where they lived before 24/02/22) and respondents who chose Ukrainian/Russian for the interview

100%	Village	Town up to 20 thousand	20-99 thous.	100+ thousand	Ukrainian	Russian
Number of respondents	435	300	270	997	1716	286
Error	5.2	6.2	6.6	3.4	2.6	6.4
Region (until 24/02/22)						
Western	41	19	25	19	31	2
Central	33	39	39	34	37	21
Southern	19	22	14	33	22	44
Eastern	7	21	22	14	11	33
Gender						
Man	47	43	41	46	46	41
Woman	53	57	59	54	54	59
Age						
18-29	18	13	15	16	17	9
30-39	18	18	16	23	21	18
40-49	17	22	19	17	18	18
50-59	17	16	19	16	16	18
60-69	14	18	16	15	14	20
70+	16	12	14	13	14	16
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)						
Village	---	---	---	---	37	9
Town up to 20 thousand	---	---	---	---	13	10
City 20-99 thousand	---	---	---	---	11	13
Cities 100 thousand and more	---	---	---	---	39	68
What language was chosen for the interview						
Ukrainian	97	90	86	80	---	---
Russian	3	10	14	20	---	---
Education						
Complete secondary / lower	37	21	24	18	26	22
Professional secondary	35	34	29	22	28	35
Higher	28	45	47	60	46	43
Non-response	0	0	0	0	0	0
Household income level						
Very low	8	6	6	6	6	9
Low	38	39	41	31	34	44
Middle	34	36	33	39	37	35
High	19	16	19	24	22	11
Non-response	1	3	2	1	1	1

Table A4. Profile of respondents with certain levels of education and respondents with certain levels of income

100%	Secondary/lower	Secondary professional	Higher	Very low	Low	Middle	High
Number of respondents	435	568	997	129	721	741	383
Error	5.2	4.5	3.4	9.5	4.0	4.0	5.5
Region (until 24/02/22)							
Western	35	24	25	30	21	29	35
Central	29	35	38	28	36	36	33
Southern	24	27	24	30	26	22	25
Eastern	13	15	13	12	18	13	7
Gender							
Man	50	44	44	30	38	52	52
Woman	50	56	56	70	62	48	48
Age							
18-29	14	12	19	3	7	20	28
30-39	16	15	26	6	16	24	26
40-49	18	18	18	13	19	19	16
50-59	15	20	15	21	17	16	15
60-69	18	19	11	25	22	11	8
70+	18	16	10	33	18	10	7
Type of settlement (until 24/02/22)							
Village	49	41	21	41	36	32	31
Town 20 thousand	10	15	12	12	14	13	10
City 20-99 thousand	11	11	12	10	13	10	10
Cities 100 thousand and more	29	33	55	37	37	46	49
What language was chosen for the interview							
Ukrainian	89	85	88	82	84	88	93
Russian	11	15	12	18	16	12	7
Education							
Complete / lower	---	---	---	42	31	21	18
Professional secondary	---	---	---	37	32	29	20
Higher	---	---	---	22	37	50	62
Non-response	---	---	---	0	0	0	0
Household income level							
Very low	11	8	3	---	---	---	---
Low	43	39	29	---	---	---	---
Middle	30	36	40	---	---	---	---
High	15	14	28	---	---	---	---
Non-response	1	2	0	---	---	---	---



2023